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I. INTRODUCTION
In the mid-nineteenth century, Territorial Governor and Super-
intendent of Indian Affairs Isaac Stevens led a mission to negotiate
treaties with the Native American1 tribes of the Pacific Northwest.
The mission resulted in several treaties, collectively known as the
Stevens Treaties, including four with the tribes of the Washington
Territory in 1854 and 1855.2 While the primary purpose of the
Stevens Treaties was to extinguish Indian claims to the lands of the
Territory and clear the way for settlement,3 the treaty drafters
included language in the treaties reserving to the tribes various off-
reservation rights, including the promise that
[t]he right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds
and stations, is further secured to said Indians in common with
* J.D. Candidate 2000, Seattle University School of Law; clerk, Washington State Court of
Appeals, The Honorable David H. Armstrong, 2000-2001. The author thanks his parents, profes-
sors, and the law review staff. Special thanks to Michelle for encouragement and patience.
1. The terms "Native Americans," "Indians," and "tribes" are used interchangeably in this
Comment to refer to American Indian tribes.
2. United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1376
(1999) [hereinafter Shellfish III]. The decision affirmed district court opinions, United States v.
Washington, 873 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D. Wash. 1994) [hereinafter Shellfish I] and United States
v. Washington, 898 F. Supp. 1453 (W.D. Wash. 1995) [hereinafter Shellfish II]. The four
treaties were: Treaty of Medicine Creek, December 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132; Treaty of Point
Elliott, January 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927; Treaty of Point No Point, January 26, 1855, 12 Stat. 939;
Treaty of Olympia, July 1, 1855, 12 Stat. 971. Shellfish II, 157 F.3d at 640 n.2.
3. Shellfish III, 157 F.3d. at 639 (quoting Shellflsh I, 873 F. Supp. at 1436).
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all citizens of the Territory, and of erecting temporary houses for
the purpose of curing, together with the privilege of hunting,
gathering roots and berries, and pasturing their horses on open
and unclaimed lands: Provided, however, that they shall not
take shellfish from any beds staked or cultivated by citizens .... 4
The tribes deemed off-reservation rights necessary to their food
supply because reservation lands did not contain adequate hunting or
fishing grounds.' Salmon were of great importance to the tribes for
ceremonial, subsistence, and commercial purposes.6 The treaty nego-
tiators recognized this need as they drafted the treaties and included
language protecting access to off-reservation food sources.7
Salmon fishing rights remain particularly important to the tribess
and have been affirmed by the courts.9 After the courts recognized
fishing rights, the tribes sought a declaration of their shellfish har-
vesting rights. The courts interpreted the right to take shellfish, such
as oysters, clams, mussels, and crustaceans, as among the rights
secured by the treaties by virtue of the presence of the "beds not
staked or cultivated by citizens" restriction, known as the "Shellfish
4. Treaty of Medicine Creek, December 26, 1854, art. III, 10 Stat. 1132 (emphasis added).
5. See Michael C. Blumm & Brett M. Swift, The Indian Treaty Piscary Profit and Habitat
Protection in the Pacific Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 407, 432
(1998); BARBARA A. LANE, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF INDIAN-WHITE CUL-
TURE CONTACT IN THE MID-19TH CENTURY 15 (1973). "To throw the fishing tribes of the
coast back upon the interior, even were the measure possible, would destroy them." Id. (quoting
a report by George Gibbs dated March 5, 1854).
6. See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 664 (1979) (citations omitted):
Although in some respects the cultures of the different tribes varied ... all of them
shared a vital and unifying dependence on anadromous fish. Religious rites were
intended to insure the continual return of the salmon and the trout; the seasonal and
geographic variations in the runs of different species determined the movements of the
largely nomadic tribes. Fish constituted a major part of the Indian diet, was used for
commercial purposes, and indeed was traded in substantial volume. The Indians
developed food- preservation techniques that enabled them to store fish throughout
the year and to transport it over great distances.
See also United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905): "[The fishing right was] not much
less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed."; United States
v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 355 (W.D. Wash. 1974) [hereinafter Boldt Decision]: "[A]
primary concern of the Indians[,] whose way of life was so heavily dependent upon harvesting
anadromous fish, was that they have freedom to move about to gather food, particularly sal-
mon .... "; LANE, supra note 5, at 6, 11-12, 15.
7. See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 700 (1979) [hereinafter Fishing Vessel]: "The negotiators apparently realized ... that
restricting the Indians to relatively small tracts of land might interfere with their securing food."
8. See LANE, supra note 5, at 40; Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission, Treaty Indian
Tribes and the Endangered Species Act (last modified March 22, 1999) <http://nwifc.wa.gov/
esa>.
9. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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Proviso."10
Several factors contributed to sharp declines in tribal shellfish
harvesting in the decades following the treaty signing. For instance,
the number of beaches open for harvesting decreased as the State of
Washington sold most of its tidelands to private parties and extensive
settlement and waterfront development followed.11 Consistent with
this activity, state statutes, regulations, and policies limited tribal har-
vesting both directly and indirectly. 2 Thus, off-reservation tribal
shellfish harvesting essentially ended relatively soon after the treaties
were signed. Then, well over a century later, the tribes asserted in
court that the Stevens Treaties secured to them the right to harvest
shellfish from all beaches within their usual and accustomed fishing
grounds, including those cultivated by shellfish growers or otherwise
occupied by private landowners.
The courts essentially upheld the tribes' claims, upsetting the
expectations of Washington's tideland owners and commercial shell-
fish growers, who had never been notified of the tribal rights. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court opinion
declaring that the treaties allow tribal members to take up to fifty-per-
cent of the harvestable shellfish from all beaches, including those
privately owned. 3 In reaching their conclusions, the courts relied on
traditional rules of treaty interpretation, which command deference to
reasonable treaty interpretations that favor the tribes. 4 However,
courts should not exercise such deference with indifference to impacts
on fundamental rights of non-Indians.
The courts recognized that although a court "cannot use equita-
ble principles in interpreting the Treaties, it can use them in deciding
how to implement the Treaties (i.e., how the tribes will be allowed to
exercise their previously interpreted rights)."'" However, the courts
did not adequately address the extent to which the treaty interpreta-
tion rules and precedents they purported to follow allowed them to
mitigate the impact of their decision on the innocent parties affected
by their rulings. Courts interpreting tribal rights should employ
equitable measures that adequately address the impact of their deci-
10. Shellfish I, 873 F. Supp. 1422, 1430 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
11. Brief for Plaintiffs at 5-6, Shellfish 1, 873 F. Supp. 1422 (No. CV 9213 - Phase I,
subproceeding No. 89-3).
12. Id. On public rights to harvest shellfish, see generally Ralph W. Johnson, Craighton
Goeppele, David Jansen, & Rachael Paschal, The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Zone Man-
agement in Washington State, 67 WASH. L. REV. 521, 571-74 (1992).
13. Shellfish III, 157 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1376 (1999).
14. See discussion infra Part I.B.
15. Shellfish III, 157 F.3d at 654.
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sions, especially where such measures do not diminish the tribal rights
involved. Recognizing a degree of unfairness and potential for hostile
encounters, the district court used its powers of equity to create a plan
to control potential inconvenience and damage. 6 However, because
the resulting conclusion had substantial consequences for the property
rights of non-Indians, the court should have further extended the
reach of its equitable powers and created an implementation plan that
preserved these rights, especially because this could be accomplished
without affecting the tribal share of shellfish or negating the treaty
signers' intent.
This Comment explores the shellfish issue in light of the Stevens
Treaties and their historical context, the rules of treaty interpretation,
the relevant treaty fishing cases, and the recent court decisions on the
shellfish issue. Part II.A explores the magnitude of the debate, the
historical background of the case, and identifies the parties involved
and their diverging interests. Part II.B describes the traditional meth-
ods and rules of treaty interpretation and recognizes their application
in this case. Part II.C examines the treaty fishing cases that estab-
lished much of the precedent that governed the shellfish case. Part
II.D outlines the relevant holdings of the district and circuit courts in
the shellfish case. Part III.A scrutinizes the courts' holdings in the
case, finds that the courts' analyses were cursory and subjective, and
concludes that the courts should have considered alternative resolu-
tions that would have offered enhanced protection of the interests of
all parties without violating prior case law. Finally, Part III.B con-
cludes the discussion with a solution that could have better served all
of the parties while remaining consistent with the law of the case.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Large Parties, High Stakes
Shellfish are embedded upon tidelands that constitute the front
yards of many of Washington's waterfront homeowners and the
farmlands and livelihood of its commercial shellfish growers. The
shellfish decision presents a unique situation for all of the parties
involved, as tribes now have a right to enter private lands and take half
of the harvestable shellfish. This aspect of the decision limits the right
of shellfish growers and tideland owners to exclude others from their
property and the fruits of their labor. Hypothetically, if government
decided to grant a right as broad as the courts declared, the grant pre-
16. See infra note 73.
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sumably would be struck down as unduly impairing the right of prop-
erty owners to exclude others. As the Supreme Court has periodically
noted, the right to exclude others is "one of the most essential sticks in
the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property. '"17
However, the special nature of these treaties"8 and circumstances of the
case make such a result possible even though it compels shellfish
growers and tideland owners to cope with an intrusion on their prop-
erty rights of constitutional magnitude-indeed, offensive to funda-
mental principles of fairness.
The unpleasantness of the Ninth Circuit's decision is augmented
by the fact that the notion of a claim of right affecting private property
was unasserted and unknown to the tideland owners and shellfish
growers for over a century.19 Because the rights involved were broad
and fundamental, the parties involved were large and persistent. The
primary interested parties in the shellfish case were the State of
Washington and Washington's Native American tribes,2" shellfish
growers, and tideland owners.
1. Tideland Owners
The district court recognized that tideland owners were "inno-
cent purchasers" with respect to tribal shellfish rights affecting their
property." Neither the original settlers nor future generations of
property owners were aware of any outstanding claims of access to
their property for shellfish harvesting. No such claim was ever
asserted publicly until the tribes filed their lawsuit. As the district
court acknowledged, "the State of Washington ... sold [to] the public
tidelands without notice ... of the preexisting tribal fishing rights,
and ... the United States ... permitted such sales to occur without
taking steps to secure [the tribal] fishing rights."22 Thus, the scope of
these rights was not clearly defined, and since the time of initial set-
tlement, property values, lifestyles, and land development have not
17. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
18. See discussion infra Part II.B.
19. Furthermore, shellfish were not involved in any of the prior tribal rights cases. Brief of
Intervenor-Defendant/Appellant 26 Tideland and Upland Private Property Owners at 4, Shell-
fish III, 157 F.3d 630 (Nos. 96-35014, 96-35082, 96-35142, 96-35196, 96-35200 and 96-35223)
[hereinafter Brief of Tideland and Upland Private Property Owners].
20. The court declared shellfish harvesting rights for eighteen tribes-the Tulalip, Puyal-
lup, Squaxin Island, Makah, Muckleshoot, Upper Skagit, Nooksack, Nisqually, Lummi, Skoko-
mish, Port Gamble S'Klallam, Lower Elwha S'Klallam, Jamestown S'Klallam, Suquamish,
Swinomish, Hoh, Stillaguamish, Suak Suiattle, and Quileute. Shellfish I1, 157 F.3d at 638 n.1.
21. Shellfish II, 898 F. Supp 1453, 1457 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
22. Shellfish I, 873 F. Supp. 1422, 1429 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
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reflected the existence of a broad tribal shellfishing right. Many of the
homes in residential waterfront communities on Washington's Puget
Sound and Hood Canal, for example, are built within feet of seawalls
and high tide levels, putting the beach and shellfish beds within steps
of the front door.
Some 200,000 of these property owners occupy about half of
Washington's 2,000 miles of salt-water shoreline.23 Although some
residents harvest shellfish from their beaches for personal use, public
or tribal harvesting has been neither commonplace nor routinely per-
mitted on privately owned beaches. Thus, the announcement of a
third-party right to take shellfish has been an unwelcome surprise for
these residents, who are inclined to fear disruption of their lifestyles
and substantial intrusion on their property rights as they have been
perceived for decades. 24 As a result, shellfish populations may be in
danger as some tideland owners choose to remove shellfish from their
beaches to avoid tribal harvesting.
2. Commercial Shellfish Growers
The concerns of the shellfish growers were congruent with those
of other tideland owners, with the addition of substantial impacts
upon their business ventures. Their loss is more critical and more
easily measured: tribal harvesting depletes their shellfish beds and
their profits. Any amount of tribal harvesting constitutes a loss of
potential profit for a shellfish grower, as his own harvest will decrease.
No farmer wants to see the fruits of his labor gratuitously exploited,
regardless of whether a legitimate right to do so exists. Because the
profit margin of most growers is modest already, the cost of height-
ened efforts in enhancing beds to produce enough extra shellfish to
offset tribal harvesting might be fatal to some shellfish businesses.25
Furthermore, the protections that the court did afford shellfish grow-
ers involve substantial burdens, as growers must expend their own
resources to determine the tribes' share of their shellfish.26
3. Native American Tribes
Although shellfish are not as economically important to the
23. Florangela Davila, Shellfish Ruling Threatens Growers, SEATTLE TIMES, April 6, 1999,
at B1; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Washington v. United States, 67 U.S.L.W. 3437 (No. 98-
1026).
24. See Brief of Tideland and Upland Private Property Owners, supra note 19, at 16 -19.
25. See Dick Steele, State at Fault for Dispute Between Indians and Shellfish Growers, SEAT-
TLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, February 10, 1998, at A9.
26. See discussion infra Parts II.D.3. and III.A.
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tribes as salmon, they are nonetheless valuable to the tribes for com-
mercial and subsistence purposes.27 Court interpretation and declara-
tion of tribal rights provide current authority and definiteness,
allowing the tribes to exercise and capitalize on their rights as inter-
preted by the courts. After the courts affirmed their rights to salmon,
the tribes inevitably faced further opposition when they attempted to
gather shellfish from private tidelands, because of the impact on tide-
land owners and shellfish growers. Thus, the shellfish lawsuit, which
began as a subproceeding to the original fishing rights case that
resulted in the famous Boldt Decision,28 was another step in the tribes'
quest to gain the most favorable interpretations of the treaties possible.
B. The Treaty Process and Rules of Interpretation
Treaties with indigenous tribes typically define rights to unique,
valuable resources and have important and far-reaching terms. Thus,
such treaties have special standing in the law, and their unique char-
acter has prompted the creation of special rules of interpretation. Sig-
nificantly, treaties with Native Americans are not viewed as
agreements by which the United States granted rights to the tribes, but
agreements by which the tribes reserved certain rights unto themselves
and granted others to the United States.29 It is also vital to note that
because treaties are made pursuant to the Constitution, the Supremacy
Clause mandates that treaty terms preempt any conflicting state
laws. 3
Also fundamental to the standing of treaties in relation to other
laws is the unique context in which the treaties were drafted and
signed. Although evidence indicates that both the United States and
the tribes negotiated the Stevens Treaties in good faith,3' there is no
question that the tribes were at a comparative disadvantage. The pri-
mary interest of the government's treaty negotiators was to facilitate
settlement.32 To that end, the negotiators organized small bands of
Indians into tribes and appointed as chiefs members who were more
receptive to settlers.33 The negotiators drafted the treaties in English
27. LANE, supra note 5, at 6; Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission, Tribal Shellfish
Resource Management (last modified April 14, 1999) <http://nwifc.wa.gov/shellfish>.
28. Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
29. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). ("[The treaties] reserved
rights.., to every individual Indian, as though named therein.").
30. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
31. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 667 (1979); infra note 101.
32. See LANE, supra note 5, at 24-25; Blumm & Swift, supra note 5, at 428-29. See also
discussion infra Part III.A.2.
33. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 664 n.5. During the winter, tribes formed villages that were
1999]
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and explained the provisions to the tribes in Chinook Jargon,34 which
was not understood by many of the Indians present.3' Tribal rights
cases recognize that "Chinook Jargon, a trade medium of limited
vocabulary and simple grammar, was inadequate to precisely express
the legal effects of the treaties, although the general meaning of treaty
language could be explained."36
Because of the unique properties of treaties and the need to com-
pensate for the overall poor bargaining position of the tribes in the
treaty-making process, courts developed treaty interpreting rules
known as the Canons of Treaty Construction (Canons).37 The courts
in the shellfish case relied on these and other judicially-endorsed can-
ons. 8 The traditional Canons require (1) interpretation of treaties as
the Indians would have understood them,39 (2) interpretation of ambi-
guities in treaty language in favor of the Indians,4" and (3) clear
expression of abrogation of treaty rights before it will be inferred.41
Other canons of construction expressly endorsed by the district
court provide that "the practical construction adopted by the parties,
noted by chief or councils, and leadership was "task oriented." LANE, supra note 5, at 8, 28.
34. The Chinook Jargon was a trade language or lingua franca with a small vocabulary and
simple grammar. Due to the existence of many different tribes with completely distinct
languages throughout the Pacific Northwest, some sort of common language was necessary for
trade and communication among the tribes. That language was Chinook Jargon, which was in
wide use from as far north as what is now British Columbia to as far south as what is now the
southern Oregon coast and inland along the Columbia River. With the arrival of white traders,
words from French, Spanish, and English were incorporated into the jargon. See generally
GEORGE GIBBS, A DICTIONARY OF THE CHINOOK JARGON, OR TRADE LANGUAGE OF
OREGON (1863); FREDERICK J. LONG, DICTIONARY OF THE CHINOOK JARGON (1909); W.S.
PHILLIPS under the pseudonym EL COMANCHO, THE CHINOOK BOOK (1913); EDWARD
HARPER THOMAS, CHINOOK, A HISTORY AND DICTIONARY OF THE NORTHWEST COAST
TRADE JARGON (1935).
35. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 667 n.10; Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 356; LANE, supra
note 5, at 28-29.
36. Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. 312, 356 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
37. The Canons were essentially the creation of Chief Justice John Marshall, whose
reasoning in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), an early Supreme Court interpretation of
Indian treaty rights, gave rise to universal guidelines for treaty interpretation.
38. See Shellfish 1, 873 F. Supp. 1422, 1428-29 (W.D. Wash. 1994); Shellfish III, 157 F.3d
630, 642-43 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1376 (1999). See generally Angela R. Hoeft,
Coming Full Circle: American Indian Treaty Litigation from an International Human Rights Per-
spective, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 203, 236-40 (1995). The Canons have been the subject of recent
criticism because of the difficulty of ascertaining the tribes' understanding of the treaties and the
reliance on non-Indian scholars for historical context. See id. at 248-55. These concerns and
others are alleged to be the cause of unpredictable results in the courts. Id. at 254-55. However,
the courts have not adopted alternative interpretive tools, and the Canons are still widely fol-
lowed today.
39. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942).
40. Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930).
41. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Washington, 96 F.3d 334, 340 (9th Cir. 1996).
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namely post-treaty conduct, may be viewed to help determine the
meaning of the treaty,"42 and that "when the parties could have more
easily expressed a particular intent by an alternative choice of words,
the chosen words can be interpreted NOT to express that intent., 43
In applying the Canons, a court must first look to the intent of
the parties with respect to the natural and ordinary meanings of treaty
terms. 4 If the terms are ambiguous, the court may resort to extrinsic
evidence and surrounding historical circumstances.45
C. Precedential Fishing Cases
None of the fishing or other tribal rights cases predating the
shellfish case specifically considered a right to harvest shellfish. Nev-
ertheless, at least three significant decisions dealing with Indian treaty
rights to anadromous46 fish are fundamentally important to the shell-
fish case.
1. United States v. Winans
The first case is United States v. Winans,47 decided by the
Supreme Court in 1905, before severe declines in salmon runs began
to occur. The Winans brothers operated fishing wheels, "device[s]
capable of catching salmon by the ton and totally destroying a run of
fish . . .,"4 on the Columbia River under license from the state. In
doing so, they excluded Indians from catching fish in the area. The
excluded Indians asserted their fishing rights in federal district court,
but their case was dismissed.4 9 The Supreme Court reversed the dis-
missal, holding that the property rights federal and state governments
granted landowners did not preempt the treaty fishing right.5° Thus,
42. Shellfish I, 873 F. Supp. at 1429 (citing Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423,
431-32 (1943)).
43. Shellfish 1, 873 F. Supp at 1429 (citing Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations v. United States,
179 U.S. 494, 538 (1900) (emphasis in original)).
44. Shellfish 1, 873 F. Supp. at 1429 (citing Chocktaw & Chickasaw Nations, 179 U.S. at
531).
45. Id.
46. "Anadromous" describes fish that swim up rivers from the ocean to breed, such as
salmon.
47. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
48. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 679 (1979).
49. See United States v. Winans, 73 F. 72 (C.C.S.D. Wash. 1896).
50. Winans, 198 U.S. at 382:
[The treaties] imposed a servitude upon every piece of land as though described there-
in .... The contingency of future ownership of lands.., was foreseen and provided
for; in other words, the Indians were given a right in the land .... It makes no differ-
ence ... that the patents issued by the [Land] Department are absolute in form.
They are subject to the treaty as to the other laws of the land.
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Winans was fundamentally important in the shellfish case because it
established that Indians could not be excluded from their traditional
fishing grounds based merely on private property rights. However,
Winans did not further attempt to define the nature or scope of the
treaty fishing right, making subsequent disputes inevitable.
2. The Boldt Decision
The fishing rights dispute climaxed in June 1974, when Judge
George Hugo Boldt of the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Washington handed down the famous and controver-
sial "Boldt Decision," which established an equal sharing principle for
allocating fish."' The Boldt Decision resolved a suit initiated by sev-
eral Native American tribes against the State of Washington, in which
the tribes sought a declaration of treaty fishing rights. 52 Many tribes
joined the suit, as well as the State Department of Fisheries, the State
Game Commission, and an association of commercial fishing compa-
nies.53
The tribes had been excluded from traditional fishing grounds
by property owners, previous state court decisions, and state
regulations, and they were generally prevented from catching fish.
Salmon populations, considered virtually inexhaustible in the 1850s,
had dwindled considerably-a circumstance that was apparently
unanticipated by the treaty signatories.5 4  Nonetheless, these
dwindling populations created a need for a method of allocating the
now scarce resource fairly and within the language of the treaties.
Fundamentally, equal sharing means a fifty-percent share for the
tribes of each run of fish that passes through tribal fishing areas.
Judge Boldt interpreted the treaty language establishing fishing rights
"in common with all citizens of the territory" as entitling the tribes to
half of the fish passing their "usual and accustomed" fishing
grounds.5" This decision was a landslide victory for a tribal popula-
tion amounting to only one percent of the state's population. 6 Boldt
defined anadromous fish, which includes salmon, as "any fish which
51. Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 669:
[I]t is fair to conclude that when the treaties were negotiated, neither party realized or
intended that their agreement would determine whether, and if so how, a resource that
had always been thought inexhaustible would be allocated between the native Indians
and the incoming settlers when it later became scarce.
55. Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 343.
56. Alex Tizon, 25 Years After the Boldt Decision: The Fish Tale That Changed History,
SEATTLE TIMES, February 7, 1999, at Al.
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spawns or is artificially produced in freshwater, reaches mature size
while rearing in saltwater and returns to freshwater to repro-
duce. ." "5 He declared that the right to take anadromous fish from
the tribes' usual and accustomed places was secured by the treaties,
but never mentioned in his opinion that shellfish or any water-dwell-
ers other than anadromous fish may have been encompassed by the
treaty.
Boldt also established the locations of the "usual and accustomed
[fishing] grounds and stations" of each of the tribes involved. He
defined the grounds as the freshwater and saltwater areas in Western
Washington that the Indians at treaty time understood to be covered
by this term and declared specific areas demonstrated by the tribes as
such grounds.5 8 Although Boldt never mentioned shellfish in his
opinion, this decision was important in the shellfish case because it
established the approach for allocating fishing resources among
Indians and non-Indians as well as the locations of the traditional
fishing grounds, both of which the shellfish courts held apply to shell-
fish. 9
3. Fishing Vessel
In the third significant case, Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n6° (Fishing Vessel), the U.S.
Supreme Court reviewed several state and federal Indian fishing rights
decisions. Most importantly, the Court upheld Boldt's equal sharing
principle.6 Fishing Vessel further defined the tribal share as only "so
much as, but no more than, is necessary to provide the Indians with a
livelihood-that is to say, a moderate living. '"62 This statement
created the "moderate living doctrine," which allows for reductions of
a tribe's share if its needs are satisfied by a lesser amount. Thus, the
Court intended the fifty-percent share of fish to be a maximum
amount, and no minimum was set.63
Based on the treaty language and the context and character of
anadromous fish, the Court held that the tribal fishing right was not
57. Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 405.
58. Id. at 406.
59. Shellfish III, 157 F.3d 630, 644 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1376 (1999).
60. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
61. Id. at 685.
62. Id. at 686.
63. Id. In the shellfish case, the Ninth Circuit did not address the moderate living doctrine
even though the appellants argued that some of the tribes have met and exceeded the loosely-
defined moderate living standard through casino gambling profits and other reliable income
sources. Brief of Tideland and Upland Private Property Owners at 48-61.
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merely a right of access to catch fish, but a right to a share of each run
of anadromous fish passing through established tribal fishing
grounds.64 The court reasoned that because the right is held in com-
mon with non-Indians and reserved by the Indians unto themselves, a
right to a share made more sense than a right of access. 5 The state
had argued that a "common fishery" at common law was "merely a
nonexclusive right of access."66  However, the Court held that the
treaty language securing a "right of taking fish" was "particularly
meaningful in the context of anadromous fisheries-which were not
the focus of the common law-because of the relative predictability of
the harvest," making it logical to infer a right to a share rather than a
right of access.67
Finally, the Court affirmed that, under the Constitution's
Supremacy Clause, "neither party to the treaties may rely on the
State's regulatory powers or on property law concepts to defeat the
other's right to a 'fairly apportioned' share [of fish] .. ."68 It further
reasoned that such concepts should not apply because they would not
have been understood or anticipated by the Indian treaty signers.69
Fishing Vessel was important in the shellfish case primarily because it
affirmed and explicated Boldt's allocation approach and provided
guidance from the Supreme Court in treaty fishing rights interpreta-
tion.
D. The Shellfish Decision
On December 20, 1994, Judge Rafeedie, who inherited continu-
ing jurisdiction over the Western Washington treaty fishing matters
from Judge Boldt, extended the reasoning of the anadromous fishing
cases to shellfish, allowing the tribes up to a fifty-percent share of har-
vestable shellfish, subject only to the court's interpretation of the
treaty's Shellfish Proviso.7" On September 25, 1998, a three-judge
panel7" for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
64. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 686.
65. Id.
66. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 678 n.23.
67. Id. at 678. This statement leaves an opening for interpretation in the shellfish case,
because shellfish are not free-swimming like anadromous fish. Because shellfish do not move
through or away from fishing grounds, it seems senseless to speak of shellfish in terms of a right
of access versus a right to a share.
68. Id. at 682.
69. Id. at 677-78.
70. See Shellfish 1, 873 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
71. Circuit Judges Lay (visiting from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals), Trott, and




substantially upheld Judge Rafeedie's decision. The court declared
the shellfish right to be "coextensive with the right of taking fish,"
allowing Indians to "take shellfish of every species found anywhere
within the Tribes' usual and accustomed fishing areas, except as
expressly limited by the Shellfish Proviso."" To soften the blow of its
fateful decision, the district court used its equitable powers to establish
various restrictions on the tribes in exercising the right it declared, and
the Ninth Circuit upheld the restrictions.73
The courts dealt with many issues during the course of the shell-
fish litigation, but four fundamental issues warrant consideration in a
discussion of the proper scope and nature of the treaty right: (1) the
question of whether shellfish may be characterized as "fish" for the
purpose of treaty interpretation; (2) the interpretation of the Shellfish
Proviso; (3) the application of the Proviso to shellfish growers; and (4)
the application of the Proviso to tideland owners generally.
1. Are Shellfish Fish?
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's decision that
the treaty fishing right is inclusive of all species of fish and shellfish."4
The circuit court essentially approved Judge Rafeedie's reasoning in
Shellfish I that "[i]f the right of taking 'fish' did not include shellfish,
the entire shellfish proviso would serve no purpose. "'7 However, this
conclusion does not resolve the issue of whether shellfish should be
72. Shellfish III, 157 F.3d 630, 645 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1376 (1999).
73. Shellfish II, 898 F. Supp. 1453 (W.D. Wash. 1995); Shellfish III, 157 F.3d at 655. The
implementation plan is long and complex. Essentially, before harvesting from a nongrower
beach, the tribes must survey shellfish beds to ascertain whether the population is sufficient to
support a tribal harvest. The survey information is then shared with the property owner and the
Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife. Tribes must also notify a tideland owner of the
type of harvest (commercial, ceremonial, or subsistence), the quantity of shellfish to be taken,
and the dates and times of the harvest. Additionally, a tribe must provide contact information
for the tribe member responsible for the harvest. Tribal harvesters may only cross privately
owned uplands upon a showing of necessity. Tribal harvesting is restricted to no more than five
days per year on nongrower beaches with less than 200 feet of shoreline, with an additional day
permitted for each additional 50 feet of shoreline. The court established further protections for
shellfish growers. A grower may entirely prohibit tribes from harvesting natural clams under-
neath artificially cultivated oyster beds, regardless of whether oysters are present. Furthermore,
growers may unilaterally modify a tribe's harvest plan and dictate how a harvest will be conduct-
ed if the plan is not compatible with their normal farming operations.
74. Shellfish III, 157 F.3d at 643. The court rejected the State of Washington's argument
that the fishing right is limited to species harvested before the treaty signing. Quoting Judge
Boldt's 1974 decision, the court held that "[tihe right secured by the treaties to the Plaintiff
tribes is not limited as to species of fish, the origin of fish, the purpose or use or the time or man-
ner of taking ... " Id. (quoting Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. 312, 401 (W.D. Wash. 1974)).
75. Shellfish I, 873 F. Supp at 1429. "This interpretation is consistent with the principle
that a treaty 'should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative."' Id. (quoting
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 439, 392 (1979)).
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treated the same as anadromous fish under the treaties. The circuit
court also affirmed that the "usual and accustomed grounds and sta-
tions" are the same for shellfish as they are for fish, noting that estab-
lishing grounds for each species of fish would be unduly
burdensome.76 The Ninth Circuit also rejected the argument that
shellfish are distinct from anadromous fish because they are part of the
land rather than the water. 7 Ultimately, all attempts by the defen-
dants and intervenors to distinguish anadromous fishing rights from
shellfishing rights failed. The court also disposed of arguments that
public harvesting was or was not permitted at treaty time by pointing
out that "whatever the status of the state law at the time of the Trea-
ties or today, the Treaties represent the supreme law of the land and
give to the Tribes the right to take shellfish from private tidelands."78
In a concurring opinion, Ninth Circuit Judge Beezer expressed
dissatisfaction with the outcome of the case, essentially supporting the
contention that shellfish should be considered separately from ana-
dromous fish for the purpose of treaty interpretation.79 The Supreme
Court reasoned in Fishing Vessel that the fishing right must be a right
to a percentage of the fish rather than a right to attempt to fish at the
traditional grounds.8" This approach was necessary because otherwise
the nets and rods of non-Indian fishermen could decimate the popula-
tion of a fish run in a particular season before it ever reached the tribal
fishing ground.8" However, Beezer noted that unlike anadromous fish,
shellfish are immobile and do not migrate or even move significantly
along beaches. No fishing device or fishing practice could impede
their arrival at tribal fishing grounds.8 2
Beezer concluded that the circuit court, in its limited jurisdiction,
could not distinguish the shellfish case and render a more logical
holding without running afoul of Supreme Court precedents set in
Fishing Vessel and Winans. 3 He noted, however, that the argument
that "shellfish beds, unharvested in the nineteenth century, were'usual and accustomed' tribal fishing grounds in 1854... strains even
76. Shellfish III, 157 F.3d at 644.
77. Id. at 647. But see McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 135 (1922) (holding that shellfish,
"having a practically fixed habitat and little ability to move are truly in the possession of the
owner of the land in which they are sunk .... ").
78. Shellfish III, 157 F.3d at 647 (citing Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 682 (1979)).
79. Id. at 657.
80. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 675.
81. Id. at 679-81.
82. Shellfish III, 157 F.3d at 658 (Beezer, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 657, 659. As the Ninth Circuit majority opinion recognizes, "[i]t must be
remembered that we are a court of limited jurisdiction." Id. at 657.
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the deferential canons of Indian treaty interpretation."84 Finally, he
suggested that the Supreme Court distinguish "between migratory fish
and shellfish; between fish runs and static fishing grounds; and
between natural shellfish and cultivated shellfish."85
2. The Shellfish Proviso
Perhaps the most crucial issue of treaty interpretation involved in
the shellfish dispute is the meaning of the terms "staked" and "culti-
vated" in the Shellfish Proviso.86 The substantial majority of Judge
Rafeedie's district court opinion deals with interpreting these terms.87
The Ninth Circuit, without significant examination, accepted the dis-
trict court's definitions of staked and cultivated, holding that the only
beds staked or cultivated are wholly artificial beds.88 The district
court had accepted extrinsic evidence and historical context to define
the terms staked and cultivated.89 The shellfish growers argued that
the terms included any beach "surrounded by stakes, or in some fash-
ion improved by human labor. ... "98 The intervening property own-
ers, on the other hand, argued that "staked" was used in its "frontier
sense" and meant "claimed as private property. ' '91
The district court accepted the definitions advanced by the tribes
as reflecting the use of these terms in the East Coast's shellfishing
industry at treaty time.92 According to these definitions, "staked"
referred to the storage of harvested shellfish until shipment in areas
marked with stakes. "Cultivated" referred to beds created by"removing oysters from their natural beds to areas where they could
grow more rapidly, or by placing shells or other material to harden the
bottom and thereby facilitate the setting of the oysters."93  Thus, in
this context, the terms staked and cultivated would refer only to beds
created artificially by shellfish growers.
Consistent with these definitions, the district court held that by
the Proviso's terms, the negotiators "intended only to exclude Indians
from artificial, or planted, shellfish beds; they neither contemplated
nor desired that Indians would be excluded from natural shellfish
84. Id. at 657.
85. Id. at 659.
86. Treaty of Medicine Creek, December 26, 1854, art. III. 10 Stat. 1132.
87. See Shellfish I, 873 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
88. Shellfish III, 157 F.3d 647-48, (citing Shellfish 1, 873 F. Supp. at 1441).
89. See Shellfish 1, 873 F. Supp. 1422, 1432-41.
90. Shellfish 1, 873 F. Supp. at 1431.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1431-32.
93. Id. at 1432, 1441.
Seattle University Law Review
beds. '94  Therefore, the court concluded, the "private property own-
ers' natural beds are not 'staked or cultivated'; thus natural beds, if
any, located on privately owned tidelands, are part of the tribal fish-
ery."9 Judge Rafeedie reasoned that the sole purpose of the Shellfish
Proviso was to protect Washington's "fledgling oyster industry" by
prohibiting Indians from harvesting shellfish from artificially created
beds. He therefore rejected competing interpretations of the Proviso
because they did not characterize the Proviso as "narrowly tailored" to
serve this purpose. For instance, a more general interpretation of"staked" would "protect activities, such as tideland ownership, wholly
unrelated to the oyster industry."9 7  Although Governor Stevens
undoubtedly envisioned a thriving shellfish industry in Puget Sound,
as agreed by the parties in the case,9" the court offered no basis for
concluding that this was the only purpose of the Shellfish Proviso.99
The district court also looked to the record of the treaty negotia-
tion to support its conclusion that the treaty signers did not intend the
Proviso to result in the exclusion of the tribes from privately owned
shellfish beds."' The court noted that the treaty negotiators, includ-
ing Governor Stevens, assumed a paternal role toward the Indians in a
good faith effort to protect and provide for them and would not have
intended to exclude the tribes from any of their fishing grounds.'
Furthermore, the court pointed to the fact that the record of the nego-
tiations shows an absence of any protest by the tribes to the Shellfish
Proviso:
The guarantee of fishing rights was a sine qua non of the Indi-
94. Id. at 1441.
95. Id.
96. Shellfish 1, 873 F. Supp. at 1437-38.
97. Id. at 1438. This statement seems to ignore inherent dependence upon tideland leasing
or ownership by shellfish growers. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
98. Id. at 1437.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 1437.
101. Id. The circuit court quotes the following statement by Governor Stevens to the
Tribes during negotiations as evidence of this point:
I think that the paper is good and that the Great Father will think so. Are you not my
children and also the children of the Great Father? What will I not do for my child-
ren and what will you not for yours? Would you die for them? This paper is such as
a man would give to his children and I will tell you why. This paper gives you a
home. Does not a father give his children a home? This paper gives you a school.
Does not a father send his children to school? It gives you mechanics and a Doctor to
teach and cure you. Is that not fatherly? This paper secures your fish. Does not a
father give food to his children? Besides fish, you can hunt, gather roots and berries.
Besides it says you shall not drink whiskey and does not a father prevent his children
from drinking the fire water?
Shellfish III, 157 F.3d 630, 648 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1376 (1999).
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ans' participation in the Treaties. The evidence indicates that
the Treaties were read and explained section by section to the
Indians during the negotiation process. Yet the minutes reveal
no instance where the Indians resisted the Shellfish Proviso."'
Thus, the court concluded, because the tribes likely would have
protested had they understood the treaty to mean their exclusion from
traditional harvesting grounds, the Proviso had no such meaning. °3
Ultimately then, the court decided that the Proviso excludes the tribes
only from shellfish beds that are artificially created by shellfish grow-
ers.
3. Shellfish Growers
Some shellfish growers enhance existing natural shellfish beds, in
addition to creating wholly artificial beds. The Ninth Circuit rejected
the district court's exclusion of the tribes from these enhanced beds,
which it had termed "de facto artificial beds." The court held that the
district court had used equitable principles to interpret the treaty,
which is not permissible. 1°4 Instead, the district court should have
applied equitable principles to limit the tribes' harvest from growers'
shellfish beds to a "fair share."'0 5 Thus, the court decided that the
tribes are entitled to fifty percent of the portion that would exist
absent the grower's enhancement.0 6 The burden of determining
preenhancement quantities is placed on the growers, who must deter-
mine the portion of the harvest that is due to their labor.'0 7 Although
this method protects growers by preventing tribe members from
unfairly reaping the fruits of their labor, the burden is immense and,
in the absence of scrupulous record keeping, allocation would largely
be based on speculation.
4. Tideland Owners
The courts essentially held that the Shellfish Proviso affords
tideland owners with naturally occurring shellfish no protection what-
soever. Subject only to the procedures implemented by the district
court, tribes covered by the treaties are entitled to half of the naturally
102. Shellfish 1, 873 F. Supp. at 1435-36.
103. Id. at 1436.
104. Shellfish II, 157 F.3d. at 651 (applying United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S.
494, 532-33 (1900)). The district court itself recognized this in Shellfish I: "In reaching its
decision, the Court may not rewrite the Treaties or interpret the Treaties in a way contrary to
settled law simply to avoid or minimize any hardship to the public .. " 873 F. Supp. at 1429.
105. Shellfish III, 157 F.3d. at 651.
106. Id. at 652.
107. Id. at 653.
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occurring shellfish on any beach within their traditional grounds as
defined by Judge Boldt.'18 The courts did not address whether this
means a right to half of the shellfish on a given beach or a right to half
of the shellfish on all included beaches. Under either interpretation, a
tribe's decision to harvest from a particular beach impacts the owner
of that beach rather than others, and tideland owners whose beds
contain the most shellfish are most likely to see their beaches har-
vested by tribes.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Reexamining the Shellfish Decision
The district court's reasoning and support for its interpretation
were weak considering the broad implications of the court's decision
for property owners and shellfish growers. The Ninth Circuit essen-
tially affirmed the decision without critical analysis of important
issues. Although the Canons of Treaty Interpretation call for
deference toward the tribes in deciding between alternative interpreta-
tions where treaty language is ambiguous, deference does not decree
victory in every case interpreting the scope of tribal rights."0 9 Fur-
thermore, although the Canons prescribe deference, they do not sup-
port that extrinsic evidence or definitions be given greater weight than
historical context and other circumstantial evidence specific to the
treaty-making process.
The shellfish courts scarcely considered circumstances evidenc-
ing the intent of the treaty-signing parties and the historical context of
the treaties, both of which are instrumental under the Canons of
Treaty Interpretation. If not for the deferential Canons, the courts
108. Id. at 646.
109. Shellfish 1, 873 F. Supp. 1422, 1428 (W.D. Wash. 1994). "[The] canons of construc-
tion ... do not give the court license to interpret a treaty according to the Indians' preferences."
Id. See also David J. Bederman, Revitalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV.
953 (1994). "Treaty interpretation is bankrupt because of unbridled deference." Id. at 954.
"Resort to extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent.., is meant to be only an exceptional occur-
rence." Id. at 973.
Adherence to the text of a treaty appears to be an intuitively obvious approach to
construction. But it is not as easy as it seems, and American courts are frequently
accused of being too quick to look behind the text of a treaty and thus to ignore the
plain meaning of the words. This criticism is wholly justified. The unfortunate
tendency to deviate from the text has persisted, despite Supreme Court pronounce-
ments that if a treaty's language is clear, no other means of interpretation may be
employed. This stricture is easily defeated by announcing that an article is capable of
more than one meaning. Such a finding sends a court quickly away from the text.
Id. at 965 (footnotes omitted).
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may have had to grapple more seriously with conflicting possible
interpretations, some of which may have insulated tideland owners
and shellfish growers from tribal harvesting concerns. Bearing this in
mind, when an important decision is made under such a deferential
standard, a court should explore whether it could employ equitable
measures to resolve the situation favorably to all parties involved.
Thoughtful consideration of the intent and understanding of the
parties, the context of the treaties, and the fishing case precedents
reveals alternative reasonable interpretations of the treaties.
1. Intent and Understandings of the Parties
The district court and circuit court both professed regard for the
established rules of treaty interpretation, but devoted little attention to
the method of interpretation they require. For instance, the courts'
attention to the tribes' and treaty drafters' probable understanding of
the Shellfish Proviso was scant, even though this understanding is
instrumental under the Canons. Rather than looking first to the
understandings of the parties to the treaties, as called for by the
Canons, the district court accepted extrinsic evidence as the basis for
its definition of the terms "staked" and "cultivated.""11  Under the
Canons, a court should first analyze the intent and understandings of
the parties and then only look to extrinsic evidence if necessary."'
Although the minutes of the treaty negotiations reveal no discus-
sion of the Proviso, it seems reasonable that the tribes would have
understood the Proviso as excluding them from shellfish beds farmed
by settlers and from tidelands claimed and occupied by settlers, not as
reserving a right to them. In fact, it seems peculiar that the tribes
would have expected that the treaty would entitle them not only to
enter the lands of settlers to take shellfish, but to take shellfish from
beds created or improved by commercial growers. Such confrontation
would be inconsistent with the intent and nature of the treaties, in
which the tribes promised "to be friendly with all citizens" and "to
commit no depredations on the property of such citizens."' 3 Thus,
silence in the treaty negotiations regarding the Proviso was neither
inexplainable nor surprising.
Dismissing the possibility that the tribes understood the treaties
as excluding them from all developed lands, the courts accepted the
argument, based on extrinsic evidence, that because the terms
110. See Shellfish I, 873 F. Supp. at 1431-36.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 1436.
113. Treaty of Medicine Creek, December 26, 1854, Art. VIII, 10 Stat. 1132.
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"staked" and "cultivated" were used in the East Coast shellfishing
industry at treaty time to refer to artificially created beds, the treaty
drafters intended the terms to have this meaning.114 This conclusion
seems dubious in light of the Canons of Treaty Construction and the
Supreme Court's proposition in Fishing Vessel that "the treaty
must ... be construed, not according to the technical meaning of its
words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they would naturally
be understood by the Indians."' 5 Given the Indians' lack of knowledge
about the culture and practices of the settlers generally, it can hardly
be supposed that the tribes were acquainted with the practices of the
East Coast shellfishing industry at treaty time. Furthermore, the
negotiators explained the treaty terms in the unrefined Chinook Jar-
gon, in which it would have been difficult or impossible to convey a
technical meaning of any of the treaty terms.
It is also unlikely that the tribes distinguished between lands on
the basis of public or private ownership at the time the treaties were
negotiated.116 More realistically, tidelands that were occupied and
used and tidelands adjacent to lands that were occupied and used were
seen as off-limits. 117 Thus, regardless of the drafters' intent, the tribes
probably understood the terms as providing that they would not har-
vest shellfish from the lands of the settlers. As illustrated by the treaty
language regarding and cases interpreting treaty hunting rights, the
parties ordinarily intended off-reservation tribal rights to be exercised
on unsettled and undeveloped lands, not on developed, private lands
near the homes of the settlers."1
Similarly, in McKee v. Gratz,1 9 the Supreme Court held that a
common understanding as to "unenclosed and uncultivated land" is that
"it is customary to wander, shoot, and fish at will until the owner sees
fit to prohibit it," and that this conclusion is more securely established
where statutory prohibitions of certain acts are limited to "enclosed and
cultivated land." 2 In the shellfish case, the treaty draws a similar dis-
tinction by prohibiting tribal shellfish harvesting from "beds staked or
114. Shellfish III, 157 F.3d 630, 647-48 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1376
(1999).
115. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979) (citing Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11
(1899)) (emphasis added).
116. See generally Bradley I. Nye, Comment, Where Do the Buffalo Roam? Determining the
Scope of American Indian Off-Reservation Hunting Rights in the Pacific Northwest, 67 WASH. L.
REV. 175 (1992).
117. See id. at 192-93 (proposing a similar principle for determining whether lands are
open and unclaimed" under the hunting provisions).
118. See id.at188
119. 260 U.S. 127 (1922).
120. Id. at 136 (emphasis added).
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cultivated," giving rise to an inference that harvesting from tidelands
not staked or cultivated was allowed. Just as the tribes could distin-
guish between open land and developed land, they could distinguish
between open beaches and staked or cultivated beaches.
Regardless of the tribes' understandings of the treaty terms, it is
doubtful that even Governor Stevens or his assistant George Gibbs
had knowledge of the practices of the East Coast shellfishing industry
or would have used technical terms to define the tribes' treaty rights.
As the Court in Fishing Vessel footnoted when refuting an argument
that the fishing right was appurtenant to specific parcels of real prop-
erty,
[T]hese [water law] concepts were [not] understood by, [n]or
explained to, the Indians. Indeed, there is no evidence that
Governor Stevens understood them, although one of his advis-
ers, George Gibbs, was a lawyer. But even if we indulge in the
highly dubious assumption that Gibbs was learned in the intri-
cacies of water law, that he incorporated them in the treaties,
and that he explained them fully to the Indians, the treaty lan-
guage would still be subject to the different interpretations pre-
sented by the parties to this litigation.121
Because Governor Stevens' trade was surveying and Gibbs' was
law and ethnology, it seems that the negotiators would have been
likely to associate the word "staked" with meanings similar to staking
the boundaries of property, staking a claim of ownership, or survey
staking, and the word "cultivated" with farming shellfish beds. These
meanings seem far more natural and ordinary in this context than the
technical definitions the courts accepted, and were used in the less
technical sense even in the shellfish industry.'22 Notes written by a
commission formed by Stevens and Gibbs to make treaties with the
Indian tribes of the Washington Territory state the fishing rights pro-
vision as reserving "the rights of fishing at common and accustomed
places if further secured to them: Proviso against stated or fenced
claims."' 23  Although this early draft of the standard treaty fishing
rights provision does not mention shellfish, the "stated or fenced
121. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 678 n.23 (1979).
122. See, e.g., Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. J. Marvin Briggs, 229 U.S. 82,
86 (1913): "The cultivation of oysters ... has become an industry of great importance...
[oyster beds] are parceled out among those owning the bottom or holding licenses from the state,
and marked off by stakes indicating the boundaries of each cultivator."
123. REPORT ON SOURCE, NATURE, AND EXTENT OF THE FISHING, HUNTING, AND
MISCELLANEOUS RELATED RIGHTS OF CERTAIN INDIAN TRIBES IN WASHINGTON AND
OREGON [hereinafter TRIBAL RIGHTS REPORT], United States Department of the Interior,
Office of Indian Affairs, Division of Forestry and Grazing (1942), at 325.
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claims" language may illustrate the nonsignificance of the later choice
of the words "staked or cultivated" for the proviso that eventually
applied to shellfish harvesting.
Recall that, according to the rules of treaty interpretation, courts
must first look to the intent of the parties with respect to the natural
and ordinary meanings of treaty terms.124 Here, both the tribes and
the treaty negotiators sought to achieve peaceful coexistence. 12 As the
district court found, the United States "believed that guaranteeing the
Indians fishing rights would not in any manner interfere with the
rights of citizens.' ' 126  Ultimately, the negotiators thus intended the
Shellfish Proviso to ensure that the rights of citizens would be pro-
tected.
In addition, the treaty language does not support the courts'
decisions allowing the tribes to take half of the shellfish that would
have been present in a shellfish grower's enhanced bed prior to culti-
vation. The Shellfish Proviso explicitly prohibits tribal harvesting
from all cultivated beds-it makes no provision for harvesting shell-
fish from beds that are enhanced and farmed although previously
natural. The courts placed the burden of establishing the pre-
enhancement shellfish populations on the growers, even though ordi-
narily the party asserting a treaty right must prove that right. 127  As
Ninth Circuit Judge Beezer noted, "[t]he district court, after hearing
testimony, determined that it 'would be very difficult-if not impossi-
ble-to develop a 'snapshot' of existing shellfish beds at the time
commercial development commenced on the Growers' property. '-128
Thus, the burden placed on the shellfish growers is onerous, and it
threatens their ability to protect their harvests from being unfairly
depleted.
Finally, in light of the actions and practices of the parties fol-
lowing treaty signing, the courts seemingly disregarded the principle
that the "practical construction adopted by the parties" is important in
treaty interpretation.'29 In other words, the manner in which the par-
124. Shellfish I, 873 F. Supp. 1422, 1429 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (citing Chocktaw &
Chickasaw Nations, 179 U.S. 494).
125. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
126. Shelfish 1, 873 F. Supp. at 1436. See also TRIBAL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 123,
at 330 ("It was also thought necessary to allow them to fish at all accustomed places, since this
would not in any manner interfere with the rights of citizens, and was necessary for the Indians
to obtain a subsistence.").
127. See Shellfish III, 157 F.3d 630, 658-59 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1376
(1999) (Beezer, J. concurring).
128. Id. at 659 (citing Shellfish II, 898 F. Supp. at 1462).




ties behaved following the execution of the treaties should have been
instrumental in interpreting the intended meanings of the terms. In
the 135 years between the treaty signing and the tribes' assertion of
their claim to shellfish, private parties purchased tidelands from the
State of Washington without notice of any tribal rights affecting their
title.13 Washington began selling its tidelands when it became a state
in 1889.131 In 1895, it passed legislation authorizing private purchase
of tidelands, even when they contained shellfish beds." 2 Then, in
1905, the United States Commissioner of Indian Affairs wrote a letter-
opinion to a state agency advising that "Indians should not be per-
mitted to trespass upon the tide lands leased from the state . . ." and
that, under the treaties, they could take fish and shellfish only from
lands used in common with the state's citizens. 33
For 135 years, including the first century of Washington's state-
hood, the tribes never publicly asserted a right to harvest shellfish
from private tidelands. Sales and leases, development, and cultivation
have all occurred without reflecting any awareness of a tribal right to
shellfish, and property values were based on clear titles. Ultimately,
however, the court's decision placed a cloud upon titles that property
owners considered to be clear for well over a century. Thus, the post-
treaty actions of both the tribes and the settlers seem to indicate
clearly the interpretation intended by the treaty signers and the inter-
pretation adopted and adhered to by the parties.
2. Context of the Treaties
The context and background of the treaties also suggest alterna-
tive interpretations of the treaties. For instance, Judge Rafeedie's rea-
soning that the sole purpose of the Shellfish Proviso was to protect the
shellfish industry seems to conflict with the actual purpose of the trea-
ties in light of historical context. The court's statement that a broad
interpretation of "staked" would "protect activities, such as tideland
ownership, wholly unrelated to the oyster industry"'34 ignores the fact
that the shellfish industry is inherently dependent upon tideland own-
ership. 3' The Shellfish Proviso was probably written to protect both
the shellfish industry and to establish clear titles to private property.
Even though Governor Stevens approached the treaty negotiations in
130. Shellfish II, 898 F. Supp. 1453, 1457 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
131. Shellfish 1, 873 F. Supp. at 1440.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1440-41.
134. Shellfish I, 873 F. Supp. at 1438.
135. Shellfish growing for profit generally takes place on tidelands that are privately owned
or leased from the state.
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good faith and with a benevolent approach, 36 his chief interest was in
clearing the way for settlement by protecting the interests of the
arriving settlers and preventing future conflicts between the settlers
and the tribes. 137
Soon after Governor Stevens arrived in the Washington Terri-
tory in 1853, he wrote a letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
George Manypenny, suggesting that "prompt measures be taken to
arrange with these Indians terms as to the purchase of their lands, in
order that the settlements which are sure to be made in the coming
years in great numbers may meet with no hindrance for this cause.",1
38
To this end, the treaties were executed to "provide for peaceful and
compatible coexistence of Indians and non-Indians in the area."' 139 As
the Supreme Court has recognized, "[b]y thus separating the Indians
from the settlers, it was hoped that friction could be minimized."'
' 40
As noted above, each of the treaties contained an article including lan-
guage providing that the tribes "promise[d] to be friendly with all citi-
zens [of the United States], and pledge[d] themselves to commit no
depredations on the property of such citizens."'' The treaties also
restricted the tribes to hunting only upon "open and unclaimed
lands," and restricted them from taking shellfish from beds "staked or
cultivated by citizens." '142 The treaty negotiators constructed each of
these provisions to protect the interests and activities of the incoming
settlers from interference in every possible way without completely
excluding the Indians from their sources of food.
In this context, it seems unlikely that Governor Stevens, as he
was clearing the way for settlement, would have inserted a clause in
the treaties limiting the scope of the settlers' title as to excluding
Indians. Furthermore, it would have been irrational for him to believe
such a large concession was necessary in obtaining signatures from the
136. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
137. Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. 312,355 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
138. Brief of Tideland and Upland Private Property Owners at 10 (citing Stevens' letter to
Commissioner George Manypenny, December 6, 1853). On April 4, 1854, Manypenny replied
to Stevens, writing: "With you, I feel anxious that Congress should immediately make provision
for extinguishing the Indian title to lands in Washington Territory." See also LANE, supra note
5, at 25.
139. Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 355 (W.D. Wash. 1974). "The United States was
concerned with forestalling friction between Indians and settlers and between settlers and the
government." Id. This notion was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Fishing Vessel: "The
primary purpose of the six treaties negotiated by Governor Stevens was to resolve the growing
disputes between the settlers claming title to land in the Washington Territory ... and the
Indians." Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 699 (1979). See also LANE, supra note 5, at 44.
140. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 669.




tribes, or that shellfish were of such necessity to their subsistence.
Shellfish were of less importance to the tribes for subsistence purposes
than salmon."' Thus, it seems incredible that Stevens, even in his
benevolent manner toward Indians, would have forever burdened the
title and property rights of the settlers and inhabitants of the territory
he governed simply to allow the tribes to collect shellfish, a relatively
modest source of food, from the private property that he sought to
protect from Indian interference. Indian trespass onto private prop-
erty to collect shellfish would surely cause the type of friction and
conflict that Stevens sought to prevent.1 44
Certainly, if Stevens did consider such a burdensome provision
necessary or desirable, he and his lawyer-assistant Gibbs could have
drafted the treaty provisions more clearly. For example, they might
have written something like "the tribes may enter private property for
the purpose of taking shellfish." Recall the treaty-interpreting canon
adopted by the courts that "when the parties could have more easily
expressed a particular intent by an alternative choice of words, the
chosen words can be interpreted NOT to express that intent. ,145 To
comply with this rule, the courts might have decided that, because the
negotiators could have more easily expressed an intent to allow the
tribes to take shellfish from private beaches, the treaty terms must not
be interpreted to express this intent. Because the parties undoubtedly
anticipated significant waterfront and tideland development, which
would be incompatible with tribal shellfish harvesting, clearer drafting
would have been especially likely had they intended tribal harvesting
to occur on private lands.
It also seems reasonable that, just as the tribes understood that
with increasing settlement the amount of open and unclaimed land
available for hunting would decrease,.46 they understood that the tide-
143. See LANE, supra note 5, at 6.
144. Evidently, the courts' broad interpretation of shellfish rights has inspired this sort of
conflict: ''This thing is creating more and more animosity with each ruling,' says Dale Briggle, a
retired IBM engineer who runs a tackle shop. . . 'I hear people saying, "If they come on my
beach, they're liable to end up with some dead Indians .... Ross Anderson, Look Who's Clam-
ming in My Yard, SEATTLE TIMES, February 15, 1998, at BI. On conflict in the fishing rights
context generally, see Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 329:
More than a century of frequent and often violent controversy between Indians and
non-Indians over treaty right fishing has resulted in deep distrust and animosity on
both sides. This has been inflamed by provocative, sometimes illegal, conduct of
extremists on both sides and by irresponsible demonstrations instigated by non-
resident opportunists.
145. Shellfish 1, 873 F. Supp 1422, 1429 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (citing Choctaw & Chickasaw
Nations, 179 U.S. at 538) (emphasis in original).
146. The obviousness of this point was explained by the court in United States v. Hicks,
587 F. Supp. 1162, 1167 (W.D. Wash. 1984):
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lands open for shellfish harvesting would decrease. Thus, it is not
particularly surprising that the tribes would not object to the provision
had they understood it as excluding them from privately developed
lands of settlers, because the tribes expected their rights to be limited
by future land ownership, occupation, and development. The district
court's reasoning that the absence of tribal protest to the Shellfish Pro-
viso in treaty negotiations and Governor Stevens' paternal tone are
evidence that the tribes understood the Proviso as only excluding them
from artificially created shellfish beds is feeble. The Proviso was
likely written not only to end and prevent conflict, but to protect
property owners' titles and rights to exclusive use.
3. Fishing Case Precedents
In the anadromous fish cases, as with other decisions interpreting
tribal rights, the courts did not devise remedies or implementation
restrictions to significantly mitigate the effects of their rulings.
Although the shellfish courts properly looked to Winans, Boldt, and
Fishing Vessel as precedent for the shellfish case, the treaty right
involved here is more demanding of the private property owner and
shellfish grower than the rights asserted by the parties in the fishing
cases. In those cases, the tribes' rights to a share of fish was protected,
and their ability to exercise those rights was guaranteed. 147 It seems
far more intrusive into the realm of fundamental private property
rights, however, to allow tribes to take shellfish from private lands.
Purposefully entitling the tribes to such a right would have been no
less intrusive than entitling Indians to hunt and gather roots and ber-
ries from occupied and claimed private lands, rather than restricting
the tribes to "open and unclaimed" lands.148
Moreover, the anadromous fish cases involved free-swimming
anadromous fish, not the stationary shellfish involved here. The
courts held that the "usual and accustomed grounds" for shellfish are
the same as for anadromous fish,149 even though in some areas the tra-
ditional salmon fishing grounds observably lack substantial shellfish
populations. This conclusion seems questionable because the fishing
The circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the Treaty, together with the
Treaty language itself describing the lands available for Indian hunting, compel a con-
clusion that the lands available for Indian hunting would change with the times.
Homesteading as well as other kinds of settlement inimical to hunting were destined
to occur and were contemplated at the time of the Treaty's negotiations.
147. See Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash.
1974); Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
148. See Treaty of Medicine Creek, December 26, 1854, art. III, 10 Stat. 1132.
149. Shellfish III, 157 F.3d 630, 644 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1376 (1999).
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grounds are based on the behavior of migratory fish, while shellfish
are generally sedentary and concentrated in specific areas. The courts
held that the grounds could not differ by species but, as Ninth Circuit
Judge Beezer noted, the percentage-based approach is rooted in the
migratory nature of anadromous fish and not necessarily applicable to
shellfish embedded on a beach. 5°
Thus, considering the fundamental nature of the rights involved
in this case, the courts should have fashioned an implementation plan
that preserved the rights that Washington's private landowners rea-
sonably believed were guaranteed by their titles. While courts may
not interpret the treaties in a way that is inconsistent with the treaty
language or prior caselaw guaranteeing tribal rights, nothing limits the
extent of a court's powers of equity in providing for how the rights
will be implemented and exercised. Because the courts employed a
rule of construction requiring deference to the tribes' favored inter-
pretation, the courts' consideration of alternative interpretations was
minimal. In light of this fact, a court making such a sweeping deter-
mination should not only seek ways to soften the impact of such a
decision, but should also consider alternative resolutions of the
conflict.
B. A Solution Overlooked?
Ultimately, the shellfish case should serve as an additional
reminder that negotiation and settlement may provide the most favor-
able and effective resolution of rights conflicts. Legal commentators
recommend negotiations between federal and state governments and
indigenous tribes as a preferable alternative to litigation."' Also,
Washington's tideland owners and shellfish growers suggest that the
state's government is obligated to facilitate such negotiations due to its
ignorance of tribal rights and failure to notify property owners of tribal
rights when it sold its tidelands as private property." 2 They have also
suggested that the state pay to enhance shellfish beds on public tide-
lands for tribal harvesting or purchase additional tidelands to provide
alternative sites."53 About half of Washington's tidelands are publicly
150. Shellfish III, 157 F.3d at 658 (Beezer, J. concurring).
151. See, e.g., Michael A. Burnett, The Dilemma of Commercial Fishing Rights of Indigenous
Peoples: A Comparative Study of the Common Law Nations, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV.
389, 432-33 (1996).
152. See Best Tribal Shellfish Plan Honors Private Property, SEATTLE TIMES, April 7, 1999,
at B4; Florangela Davila, Shellfish Ruling Threatens Growers, SEATTLE TIMES, April 6, 1999, at
B1; Shellfish Dispute Still Needs Settling, TACOMA NEWS TRIBUNE, April 6, 1999, at A12.
153. Seeid.
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owned," 4 and nearly every Indian reservation in Western Washington
includes significant tidelands.' Furthermore, a court declaration of
settlement defining the scope of the shellfish right as up to fifty per-
cent of the shellfish from beaches that are open and unoccupied or
from public tidelands might be more consistent with the treaty intent
and understanding of the parties.5 6 As Judge Beezer stated in his con-
curring opinion,
Exclusive use of private tidelands by commercial growers should
not deprive the Tribes of their treaty share of shellfish; the
Tribes could be allocated half of the naturally occurring shellfish
without disturbing the hard-earned and long-held property
rights of private growers. Shares of the shellfish taken, of
course, need not be determined by the place where the shellfish
are taken. Thus, a tribal share of shellfish could come from res-
ervation land, government land or private tidelands acquired by
the tribe.5 7
Beezer also properly observed that Fishing Vessel allows such an
outcome, as it held that "fish taken by treaty fishermen off the reser-
vations and at locations other than 'usual and accustomed' sites...
[are] to be counted as part of the Indians' [treaty] share."' 58 Thus,
consistent with prior case law, beaches that are farmed for shellfish or
adjacent to lands developed with homes and other signs of occupation
and staking of boundaries could have remained off-limits to tribal har-
vesters. This outcome would not only have been consistent with prior
case law, the rules of treaty interpretation, the treaty language, and the
understandings of the treaty-signing parties, it would also have pro-
tected the rights of all parties involved.
IV. CONCLUSION
The shellfish case brought to the legal and social forefront prop-
erty rights conflicts that were, for the most part, unanticipated by the
state and its property owners. The United States and the tribes
154. Brief of Tideland and Upland Property Owners at 20.
155. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, STATE
OF WASHINGTON (1982).
156. Such a solution was contemplated in settlement negotiations between the State and the
tribes in 1995, but an agreement was never reached. See Rob Carlson, Shellfish Deal May Pro-
vide Simplest Solution, TACOMA NEWS TRIBUNE, June 27, 1995, at B3. The Ninth Circuit
recognized these efforts, noting that "[t]he parties have apparently made sincere efforts to settle
this dispute; we hope that our decision assists and renews that effort." Shellfish 1II, 157 F.3d
630, 657 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1376 (1999).
157. Shellfish III, 157 F.3d at 659 (Beezer, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
158. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 687 n.29 (1979).
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intended the treaties to prevent conflict between Indians and settlers,
not to generate it. In April 1999, the United States Supreme Court
denied a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit's
decision.159 Ultimately, the tribes are unquestionably entitled to har-
vest shellfish off-reservation. However, the courts in the shellfish case
should have considered ways to temper the consequences of a decision
in favor of the tribes because the decision has significant impact on
other parties. Reestablishing tribal rights becomes difficult when
these rights conflict with other longstanding rights. Although nego-
tiation and settlement may produce the best remedy, courts are under
an obligation to consider reasonable alternative resolutions to rights
conflicts, especially when such resolutions protect tribal rights and
minimize the impact on non-Indians of reestablishing those rights.
159. Shellfish III, 157 F.3d 630, cert. denied, Washington v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1376
(1999).
1999]
